In this paper, we use stochastic dynamic programming to model the choice of a municipality which has to design an optimal waste management program under uncertainty about the price of recyclables in the secondary market. The municipality can, by undertaking an irreversible investment, adopt a ‡exible program which integrates the existing land…ll strategy with recycling, keeping the option to switch back to land…lling, if pro…table. We determine the optimal share of waste to be recycled and the optimal timing for the investment in such a ‡exible program. We …nd that adopting a ‡exible program rather than a non- ‡exible one, the municipality: i) invests in recycling capacity under circumstances where it would not do so otherwise; ii) invests earlier, and iii) bene…ts from a higher expected net present value.
Introduction
The design of e¤ective solid waste management strategies is a crucial issue for policy makers not only at the (inter)national level, where guidelines, targets, and strategies are set (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2002; European Commission, 2010), but also at the local level, where waste is actually produced, collected, and treated.
In the last decades, the amount of municipal solid waste produced by industrialized societies has been increasing (Eurostat, 2011; EPA, 2011) . This trend, together with growing attention on environmental pollution, human health, and resource recovery, has stimulated a wide debate on the strategies to be implemented to reduce the amount of waste produced and treat the waste collected in an e¤ective and sustainable way (OECD, 2007) . 1 In particular, starting from the late 1970s, the U.S. …rst, and later the EU, introduced a stricter regulation for the construction and operation of land…lls 2 in order to promote recycling and incineration /incinerators as alternative disposal methods (EEA, 2009 and Kinnaman, 2006) . Incinerators are expensive, however, and their e¤ect on human health is controversial. As a consequence, citizens seem more willing to spend time sorting their waste for recycling than accepting the operation of an incinerator in their neighborhood (Giusti, 2009 ). 3 Thus, although their pro…tability is still debated, an increasing number of municipalities have introduced recycling programs (in order) to meet citizens'preferences (see, e.g., Kinnaman, 2006) .
In this paper, we consider a municipality designing a new waste management program that integrates the preexistent land…lling with recycling as an alternative waste disposal method. 4 We assume that a price is paid to the municipality for recycled materials and that such a price follows a geometric Brownian motion. We also assume that recycling has higher operative costs than land…lling. The municipality can choose between a non- ‡exible and a ‡exible waste management program.
By investing in a non- ‡exible program (hereafter NFP), the municipality may partially or totally substitute land…lling with recycling. This decision is irreversible and implies that, irrespective of a change in the relative convenience of recycling with respect to land…lling, the purchased recycling capacity must always be fully used.
In contrast, by investing in a ‡exible program (hereafter FP), the municipality purchases recycling capacity but keeps the option to fully use the preexisting land…lling capacity whenever 1 Municipal solid waste can be disposed by essentially adopting four methods: land…lling, incineration, recycling, and composting. See Goddard (1995) for a discussion of these disposal methods. 2 In the U.S., after the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 providing federal guidelines for the operation of land…lls, their number (of land…lls) has signi…cantly reduced (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000b ). In the EU, after the Directive 1999/31/EC, which …xed targets for the reduction of biodegradable municipal waste going to land…lls, the quantity of waste land…lled has reduced from 68% in 1995 to 33% in 2009 (Eurostat, 2011) . 3 Even though land…lling has strongly reduced, it is still adopted as a residual method together with recycling. As for the EU countries, in 2009 shares of waste land…lled of 14% and 17% were reported by Norway and Luxembourg, respectively. France, Italy, Finland, and the U.K. reported shares in the range of 32% to 50%. Among the EU-12 member states, the highest shares in 2008 were reported by Greece (81%), Portugal (62%), Ireland (62%), and Spain (52%), (Eurostat, 2011) . 4 Note that considering incineration as an alternative disposal method would make no di¤erence in our analysis.
changes in the relative convenience make it pro…table. By combining the two disposal methods, the FP guarantees a certain degree of operational ‡exibility, which may be bene…cial under uncertainty about the price for recycled materials. This ‡exibility, however, comes at a cost. More speci…cally, we assume that the FP setup requires a sunk investment cost which depends on the chosen recycling capacity, i.e., the chosen degree of ‡exibility.
The problem faced by the municipality is twofold, and we solve it in two steps. First, the municipality must determine the recycling capacity, taking into account its uncertain pro…tability and the option of land…lling whenever recycling becomes unpro…table. Second, the municipality must set the investment time threshold, triggering the adoption of the optimally designed FP.
Having designed the optimal FP, we compare the investment in such a program with the investment in an NFP where, as stated above, the option to switch back to land…lling is not available. We …nd that adopting an FP rather than an NFP gives the municipality two main advantages. First,
we show that the municipality may be willing to invest in recycling capacity under circumstances where investment in an NFP would not be undertaken. Second, we show that an investment in an FP may be undertaken earlier than one in an NFP and also provide a higher expected net present value (hereafter NPV).
The intuition behind these results is that the municipality that adopts the FP, by holding the option to switch back to land…lling, may, if needed, adjust the waste disposal operations and so optimally hedge against uncertainty about the pro…t from recycling. This hedging policy may prove particularly valuable when net revenues from recycling remain low and/or are volatile. In contrast, when net revenues are high and stable, the exercise of the option to switch back to land…lling becomes unlikely and the value of the hedging policy vanishes. Hence, the municipality may, by investing in an FP that guarantees operational ‡exibility, start recycling when the relative net revenues are too low to justify the investment in an NFP instead. Moreover, this may also occur with a higher payo¤ in terms of NPV.
Several papers have studied the design of waste management programs in the presence of alternative disposal strategies. In a deterministic frame, some pioneer investigations have been conducted by Huhtala (1997) and McAsey (1997, 2001b Their main …nding is that recycling, due to its uncertain pro…tability, may not be adopted even when it is less expensive than land…lling. Hence, their analysis advises policy intervention in favor of price stabilization as a tool for enhancing recycling.
Our paper contributes to this literature in two respects. First, under uncertainty about pro…t from recycling, we study the optimal design of a program where the simultaneous combination of two disposal strategies, i.e., land…lling and recycling, is feasible. Second, we consider how the presence of land…lling as a preexisting and residual method a¤ects i) the degree of operational ‡exibility in the waste management program and ii) the timing of its adoption. 5 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic setup of our model. In section 3, we determine the optimal recycling capacity. In section 4, we study investment value and timing. In section 5, we use some numerical examples to illustrate our …ndings.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are available in the Appendix.
The Basic Setup
Consider a municipality currently using land…lling as a waste disposal method and contemplating the opportunity of integrating it with recycling. Following High…ll and McAsey (2001) , we restrict our analysis to the recycling programs o¤ered by the municipality and do not consider any recycling activity undertaken by individuals on their own initiative. By integrating these two disposal methods, the collected waste may be partially or totally recycled, with the municipality still holding the option of land…lling. 6 Both disposal methods are costly. Denote by c L and c R the operating costs of land…lling and recycling waste, respectively. We assume that c R c L > 0. 7 Compared to land…lling, recycling involves additional costs for collection, selection of di¤erent types of waste fractions (i.e., plastic, paper, glass), and for their transport to the di¤erent recycling plants. Collection costs depend on the requirements of the program, for instance how the recyclables have to be sorted by households (i.e., single-stream or multi-stream), the frequency of the collection of the di¤erent sorted waste fractions, and the level of participation in the program. The selection and 5 In the real option literature, the value of operational ‡exibility has been deeply investigated. See, e.g., Kulatilaka (1988 Kulatilaka ( , 1993 , Triantis and Hodder (1990) , and He and Pindyck (1992) . In this literature, our paper belongs to a recent family of papers studying investment in ‡exible systems where the degree of ‡exibility is optimally chosen. See, e.g., Di Corato and Moretto (2011) on investment in a biogas digester under ‡exible diet composition and Moretto and Rossini (2012) on partial outsourcing and ‡exible vertical arrangements. 6 In our paper, we implicitly consider a non-exhaustible land…ll. The reason for this is that we want to focus on the bene…t of implementing hedging policies against uncertain recycling pro…t through a combination of waste disposal technologies. Note that at no loss our frame is su¢ ciently general to consider an alternative technology such as incineration. 7 This assumption is in line with Kinnaman (2006, p. 220) reporting that "On a per-ton basis, recycling is roughly twice as costly as land…ll disposal." The cost of land…lling may also include the compensation paid to households living near the land…ll (Kinnaman, 2006) . processing costs per ton increase with the number of commingled commodities, (EPA, 2012).
Recycled materials are valuable on a secondary market, and the municipality is paid a price p t for each unit of recycled waste, where units are expressed in tons. 8 Let us assume that such a price evolves according to the following geometric Brownian motion: dp t p t = dt + dz t ; with p 0 = p
where is the expected growth rate, is the volatility parameter, and dz t is the increment of the standard Wiener process satisfying E [dz t ] = 0, E dz 2 t = dt. In the following, we simplify the analysis by considering the optimal disposal of one unit of waste which is potentially recyclable. Such a unit can be thought as including only one speci…c recyclable material, i.e., glass, paper, plastic, metals, or a mixture of recyclable materials. In the …rst case, p t is the price paid for a speci…c material. Otherwise, p t can be a price vector or, for simplicity, an average price.
A waste management program
Denote by W L the waste management program where the collected waste is totally land…lled and by W R the program where a portion 2 [0; 1] of waste is recycled while the rest, 1 , is land…lled.
When both disposal methods are feasible, the collected waste could be managed in order to minimize the cost of waste disposal, c t , that is:
where (c L + p t ) represents the total bene…t per unit of recycled waste, i.e., the price paid to the municipality plus the avoided land…lling cost.
The relative convenience of using land…lling or recycling depends on market prices. In this respect, we can have the following two scenarios:
This means that, whenever the current price of recycled material does not cover the increase in the disposal cost, land…lling is the less costly disposal method. In contrast, whenever the current 8 The implicit assumption is that the municipality is a price-taker. The arrangements for selling the recycled materials in the secondary markets are di¤erent and a¤ected by the national legislative framework. In the U.S., municipalities can sign contracts with private entities providing these services (EPA, 2012). In the EU, there is heterogeneity due to the di¤erent approaches adopted by the national Producer Responsibility System (PRO). In Italy, e.g., CONAI, the national PRO, pays municipalities a "compensation fee"for taking back packaging waste from separated waste collections. price, p t , covers the additional disposal cost, the municipality recycles a share 2 [0; 1] of the collected waste. In the following, we (will) refer to the …rst and second scenarios as "Land…lling" and "Recycling", respectively.
The analysis can be simpli…ed by noting that the marginal advantage of a waste management program adding the program W R to the existing W L strictly depends on the bene…ts the municipality may obtain under each scenario, that is 
r is the di¤erential operator with r as interest rate.
As shown in appendix A.1, the solution to [5] [6] is
where 1 > 1 and 2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation
and
In equation (7) 
which, as above, represents the expected net bene…t accruing from the recycling of a portion 2 [0; 1] of the total collected (recyclable) waste.
The Optimal Waste Management Program
In this section, we determine the recycling capacity, , that a municipality must purchase to ensure an optimal waste management program. As discussed above, when an FP, W , has been adopted, the municipality holds the options to switch to recycling and back to land…lling. These options are particularly valuable under uncertain pro…t from recycling since they provide the ‡exibility needed to conveniently rearrange the waste disposal operations. As can be seen from equations (7.1-7.2), the value of these options depends linearly on the degree of operational ‡exibility which, in our setup, corresponds to the recycling capacity, . However, higher operational ‡exibility does not come free of cost so that, given the higher investment cost, the municipality may have to give up operational ‡exibility and invest in a less costly NFP, c W .
Let us denote by I( ) the sunk investment cost required to add W R to the existing W L . Assume that it is a function of the recycling capacity and that it takes the following convex functional form:
where i 1 and i 2 are dimensional investment parameters.
The investment cost in (9) is obtained by summing two components. The …rst component, i 1 , captures costs which are linear in the recycling capacity, , as, for instance, the cost of informing households about the new collection program, the cost of buying and providing households with speci…c bins for the waste fraction(s) to be collected separately, the cost of transporting waste, etc. The second component, i 2 , accounts for nonlinear costs 10 such as the cost of keeping idle land…lling capacity when recycling or the additional cost of transports to di¤erent recycling facilities or to the land…ll (see Nagurney and Toyasaki, 2005) . Thus, by the second cost component, we mainly want to account for the costs directly related to the implementation of a more complex FP allowing for both disposal alternatives.
In order to focus on the role that technological ‡exibility may have in the adoption of recycling, we assume, in the following, that the …rst linear cost component, i 1 , must be paid whenever recycling is adopted while the second component, i 2 , is conditional on the municipality having decided to keep the option to switch between land…lling and recycling whenever pro…table, i.e., if the municipality invests in an FP. Without loss of generality we may set i 1 = 0 and i 2 = i and then proceed (in order) to determine the optimal recycling capacity . Note that this must be done under both "Land…lling'and "Recycling'scenarios, i.e., for p t d and for p t > d, respectively.
3.1 Flexible program: optimal recycling capacity under the "Land…lling" scenario
As discussed above, program W L is preferred to W R when the price for recycled materials, p t , does not cover the increase in disposal costs determined by the introduction of recycling, d. This implies that by investing in an FP when p t d the municipality is only purchasing the option to adopt recycling later as soon as p t > d. The optimal recycling capacity, ; must then maximize
where
Solving the maximization problem yields the following proposition:
The optimal recycling capacity to be adopted in an FP when investing at p t d is
where p = (
Proof. See section A.2 in the appendix. Note that the optimal recycling capacity, (p t ); is increasing in price p t . This makes sense, considering that a higher p t implies a higher probability of switching to program W R where the municipality starts recycling. Note also that (p t ) is decreasing in the investment cost magnitude, i; and increasing in the parameter illustrating the convexity of the costs, ; respectively. 11 This implies that, as expected, a higher recycling capacity is installed as investment costs drop. However, there is a ceiling for recycling capacity. Hence, there exists a price level, p, such that for p p t it is always worth choosing the highest feasible recycling capacity, i.e., (p t ) = 1: This means the municipality switches from a waste management program where it land…lls the entire amount 1 1 Note that
of collected (recyclable) waste to a program where such waste is completely recycled. It is worth noting that the higher the marginal value, O R p 1 t , of the option to switch to W R , the higher is the desired recycling capacity.
By substituting the optimal recycling capacity, (p t ), into the net present value function, we obtain:
3.2 Flexible program: optimal recycling capacity under the "Recycling" scenario
When p t > d; recycling is worthwhile and the municipality adopts program W R as soon the investment in the ‡exible program W has been undertaken. The optimal recycling capacity, ; is given by the solution of the following problem:
Proposition 2 The optimal recycling capacity to be adopted in an FP when investing at
Proof. See section A.3 in the appendix.
We observe that (p t ) is increasing in p t in the interval d < p t < p. In this respect, we need to distinguish the presence of two components. First, as p t increases, due to larger expected net bene…ts, pt r d r ; the municipality would prefer to invest in high recycling capacity. Second, (p t ) is increasing in the value of the option to switch back to land…lling, i.e., O L p 2 t . This is not surprising, considering that the option to restore W L is an extremely valuable hedging policy against ‡uctuations in the net revenues from recycled waste. However, we also note that such a positive e¤ect is decreasing in p t . This is due to the relationship between the value of the option to switch back to land…lling and the distance between p t and d or, di¤erently put, the probability that once the investment has been undertaken, p t reaches the region p t < d where the program W L is less costly than W R . Accordingly, the contribution of this second component is decreasing in p t since the higher the price of recycled materials, the less likely is the exercise of the option to switch back to W L . Studying the impact of investment costs, it is immediate to see that, as in (11.1), the recycling capacity, (p t ); is decreasing in i and increasing in ; respectively. In other words, the lower the investment cost, the higher the recycling capacity installed.
It is worth discussing the role played by the sign of the term = i O R d 1 , which represents the net marginal cost of investing in full capacity. Note that this is, in fact, given by the di¤erence between the marginal investment cost, I 0 (1) = i, and the marginal value of the option to switch to
t , evaluated at the boundary p t = d. Thus, if at d the marginal bene…t, O R d 1 , is higher than the marginal cost, i, of investing in the last unit of feasible capacity, the municipality invests in the maximum recycling capacity. In contrast, if i > O R d 1 the municipality may opt for partial recycling capacity. This will occur if prices for recycled material are lower than the level p which, according to (12.1), triggers the choice of a 100% recycling capacity ( (p t ) = 1). Otherwise, again, prices may be su¢ ciently high to justify (p t ) = 1.
Finally, by plugging the optimal recycling capacity, (p t ); into N P V R we have:
(ii) for 0;
Non- ‡exible program: optimal recycling capacity
Let us now set the optimal recycling capacity, , for an NFP c W . Recall that in this case I( ) = 0:
As above, such a capacity is given by
Thus, by the linearity of b V (p t ; ) in , it is straightforward to show that this is the case. 12 Proposition 3 The optimal recycling capacity to be adopted when investing in an NFP is
As expected, the municipality chooses the maximum recycling capacity if the expected net bene…ts from recycling, 
Investment Value and Adoption Timing
In this section, we study the timing of the investment in an optimal waste management program. To this end, we derive the value of the option to invest and then determine the conditions characterizing an optimal investment time strategy.
First, let us de…ne by W and c W the ‡exible and the non- ‡exible program where the recycling capacity has been set at its optimal level, (p t ): Second, we consider the option to invest in the continuation region 0 < p t < e p where e p is the price threshold triggering investment. The value of such an option is given by
where = infft 0 j p t = e pg is the optimal investment stopping time and
The problem can be rearranged as follows: 13
From the …rst-order condition of the maximization problem 14 we obtain
Finally, the de…nition of a maximum requires that the following second-order condition should hold at e p:
Let us now study the investment policy under both scenarios, "Recycling" in Section 4.1 and "Land…lling" in Section 4.2.
Investment in a ‡exible program under the "Recycling" scenario
We consider the option to invest in the subset d p t where W R W L . In this case, the recycling capacity would be used as soon as the municipality has invested in W . The desired degree of ‡exibility, , will be chosen taking into account price volatility and the magnitude of investment costs, i. In addition, the municipality will choose it, aware that it would still be possible to switch back to W L : As discussed above, this consideration should favor investment in a higher recycling capacity.
By using Proposition 2 we can distinguish between two cases in terms of adopted recycling capacity. This will depend on the comparison between the magnitude of the investment cost, i, and the value of the option to switch to recycling, O R d 1 . We start by considering case b) where 0 and the municipality opts for the highest feasible level of ‡exibility, i.e., = 1. Substituting (11.4) into (14.1), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 When 0 the optimal investment threshold, p ( d), for the adoption of an FP with = 1 is given by the solution of the following equation
Proof. See section A.5 in the appendix. According to Proposition 4, it is worth investing at p p t . In equation (15) but also on the presence of land…lling as a waste management option. This e¤ect is captured by the second term on the RHS of (15) . As shown in section A.5, @p @O L < 0. In other words, the more valuable the option to switch back to W L , the earlier, in expected terms, the ‡exible program W , is adopted. Rearranging (15) as follows
in Eq. (15.1), the …rst term of the RHS accounts for the higher investment cost, i , to be paid in order to have a ‡exible program allowing for both recycling and land…lling. As expected, given that such a program is more costly than a non- ‡exible one, the municipality should wait longer before investing. Waiting before making an investment takes even longer under uncertainty. Note, in fact, that the …rst term, 1 2 2 1 , must be added to the user cost per unit of capital, r, to account 1 5 The investment timing should account for the option value arising from new information about the variables a¤ecting the pro…tability of the investment decision. This consideration implies a higher investment threshold with respect to the one set under the standard NPV approach. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chap. 5).
for uncertainty. However, this e¤ect is balanced by the second term in the RHS of (15.1), which represents the option to land…ll whenever recycling is less pro…table than land…lling. This clearly reduces the uncertainty characterizing the investment. Note that the second e¤ect may also prevail, leading to a faster adoption of the ‡exible program. This will occur if the following condition is met:
that is, whenever the value of the option to land…ll evaluated at p covers a portion of the investment cost i (note that 1 + 2 1 2
< 1).
We now proceed by studying case a) in Proposition 2 where > 0. In contrast with the previous case, the municipality may invest in a ‡exible program W with a lower degree of ‡exibility, i.e., since the municipality will not be able to exploit the entire potential of the recycling strategy.
In the appendix, we show that 
Proof. See section A.6 in the appendix. According to Proposition 5, the municipality should invest in the region where p p t p.
Note that investments in programs with < 1 are undertaken when, at p; the expected present value of earnings, p r ; is not su¢ ciently high to cover level which, as we show in the appendix, triggers investment in programs with full recycling capacity. By rearranging (16), we obtain
Again, we stress the role played by the option to switch back to W L : In fact,) in this case too 16 @p @O L < 0. This implies that also when < 1, the higher the value of the option to restore W L , 1 6 See section A.6 in the appendix.
the faster, in expected terms, the ‡exible program W is introduced.
By comparing the investment in a lower recycling capacity with the investment in a program providing 100% recycling capacity but no option to restore W L ; we notice that the former may be undertaken earlier if the following condition holds:
that is, when at p the value of the option to restore W L is higher than a percentage ; is higher than level . In fact, if this condition is met, investment occurs at a price level high enough to cover the investment cost.
Finally, by focusing only on the case 17 where (p ( ) ) = 1 we can also show that a higher expected net present value corresponds to an earlier investment, p ( ) < b p . In fact, by comparing at p investment in W with investment in c W , it is immediate to show that to conclude our discussion on the relationship between investment
In words, this means that a W program guarantees earlier investment and a higher expected net present value when, at the investment time, the value of the option to land…ll, O L p 2 , covers the sum of investment cost, i , plus the di¤erence between the discounted expected value of the ‡ow of increased disposal costs, , from recycling. Note that both ‡ows start at p and are consistently discounted, taking into account the random time period needed for reaching price level b p .
Investment in a ‡exible program under the "Land…lling" scenario
In this section, we examine the investment strategy for the range of values
In this range, even if land…lling is still pro…table, the municipality may consider the possibility of adopting a ‡exible waste management program W so that it can switch to W R as soon as p t d.
As we show in appendix A.7, this never occurs. In fact, we prove that Proposition 8 If p t < d, the municipality never invests in a ‡exible waste management program with 1.
Proof. See section A.7 in the appendix. By plugging (10.2) into (14.2) it is straightforward to show that the second-order condition is violated. This implies that an investment time trigger maximizing (14) does not exist in the range of prices considered. As can be easily seen in (10.2), the option to switch to W R , even if valuable,
is not worth the investment cost when p t < d. Its expected net present value is increasing in p t as the probability of a switch increases so that the municipality prefers to postpone the investment.
Finally, note also that di¤erently from the option to switch to W L ; the option to switch to W R does not pay any "dividend" when held.
Probability and expected time of adoption
As explained above, due to the presence of uncertainty, the municipality may keep open the option to invest for long time periods. In this respect, it is important, in terms of informing policy makers, to determine, at least in expected terms, the length of such a period. In the following, we will therefore …rst determine the probability of adoption within a particular time period in the future and then the expected time of adoption.
For this purpose we …rst remember that investment occurs at stopping time = infft 0 j p t = e pg. Note that as prices for recycled materials follow the stochastic process (1), also becomes a stochastic variable. Hence, denoting by T the time period in which a …rst passage through barrier e p may occur, the cumulative probability of investment is given by the following function (see Harrison, 1985, p.14) : Following Dixit (1993) , the probability of an eventual investment (i.e., T ! 1) is 2 the expected time is 1. This is due to the drift which drives the price away from barrier e p. Since, by (20) , the probability of hitting the barrier is lower than one, the expected time tends to 1 for T ! 1.
Finally, in order to assess the relative pro…tability of a ‡exible program with respect to a non- ‡exible one, we derive from (18) the following measure:
By (22) we are basically comparing the expected present values of both possible programs evaluated at the same time period. In particular, the comparison occurs at the earliest investment time for the two projects. 18 For instance, if the ‡exible program is adopted earlier, i.e., x < b p , the expected present value of the non- ‡exible program, N P V c W (b p ), is discounted back to x by using the stochastic discount factor, ( 
Numerical Examples
In this section, we use some numerical examples to illustrate the e¤ect of operational ‡exibility on the investment timing and on the value of a waste disposal program. We start our calculations by setting d = 1: This is equivalent to normalizing our frame with respect to the additional cost of disposal incurred when recycling. 19 By using (1), it is straightforward to show that the ratio q t = p t =d evolves according to the following Brownian motion:
Note that recycling is consistently pro…table for any q > 1 and not pro…table otherwise.
In our exercise, we let the other parameters vary as follows:
1. Price trend and volatility -We let drift, , and volatility, , take values f0; 0:025g and f0:1; 0:2; 0:3g, respectively. Note that a positive drift may capture both an expected increase in the price for recycled material and/or an expected decrease in the gap between recycling and land…lling operating costs. A driftless motion simply implies that, even if ‡uctuating over time, ratio q t on average takes the initial value q. See Table 2 . In each table, we allow for increasing levels of volatility in order to check the impact of uncertainty on the choice of the program and on the investment policy. In particular, we expect that under higher uncertainty i) the municipality prefers a higher degree of ‡exibility, and ii) investment in a costly ‡exible program should be delayed. As a result, the municipality must trade o¤ ‡exibility with investment delay. In light of this trade-o¤, it is of interest, however, to check how a ‡exible program performs compared to a non- ‡exible one.
2. Investment cost -We consider the impact of investment cost by letting its magnitude, i, and convexity, , take values f2:5; 5; 10g and f2; 4g, respectively. As discussed above, higher i and lower will likely make a ‡exible program less desirable since the marginal investment cost of ‡exibility increases. See Tables 1 and 4. 3. Interest rate -We set the interest rate, r, equal to 5% in our calculations. We then check for the e¤ect of a variation by raising it to 10%. It is immediate to see that when investing in a ‡exible program, this variation implies, ceteris paribus, a higher user cost of capital. Hence, in order to invest, the ‡exible program must yield higher returns. With a higher interest rate, investment is likely to occur when q is high enough to cover the higher opportunity cost of capital. See Table 3 .
In our calculations, we set 1 as initial level for q. This means that the additional cost of recycling is covered by revenues from the sale of recycled materials. Note that 1) as discussed above, this does not necessarily trigger investment in any of programs under analysis, and 2) this assumption does not in ‡uence the comparison between a ‡exible and a non- ‡exible program. In this respect, recall that when comparing the two programs on the basis of probability of investment and expected investment timing, what matters is the temporal distance between the optimal investment thresholds set for each program. We compare the probabilities of eventual investment and investment within 10 years (T = 10) with or without ‡exibility.
In Table 1 , we set = 0:025; r = 0:05 ,and = 2 and we let vary the investment cost magnitude, i, and the volatility, . We observe that within a ‡exible program, the municipality would always prefer to purchase the maximum feasible recycling capacity, i.e., = 1. Furthermore, in the majority of cases the investment in such a program would occur earlier than the investment in a non- ‡exible program. In particular, we note that this is always the case for the highest level of volatility. This makes sense, considering that under highly uncertain recycling pro…tability, the municipality may fully exploit the potential of the hedging policy adopted by investing in a ‡exible
program. This consideration is also supported by the performance of the ‡exible program in terms of expected investment time and value. In fact, we observe that the presence of ‡exibility may induce important reductions in the length of time needed for eventual investment. Note that (x; b p ) is always increasing in the level of uncertainty. Interestingly, the ‡exible program may perform even better in some cases, for instance if i = 5 and = 0:3. In this case, the value attached to the ‡exible program is equivalent to 105% of the value of a non- ‡exible one. Not surprisingly, (x; b p ) is decreasing in i, i.e., the higher the investment cost of the ‡exible program, the lower the net bene…t in comparison to the non- ‡exible one. In general, however, even when (x; b p ) is lower than 1, we note that the score is quite high. This is particularly noteworthy when considering that a non- ‡exible program is actually costless in terms of investment (i = 0). Finally, note that the investment thresholds for both programs are increasing in . This is due to the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility which, as is standard in the real option literature, requires a more prudent investment policy. Investment should, in fact, occur at higher price levels. This, in turn, requires waiting longer before investing. This period of inaction may become in…nitely long in the presence of a weak expected growth in the net bene…t of recycling (q). In Table 1 , this is actually the case for = 0:3. This …gure must be analyzed in combination with the probability of investment which, up to Table 1 , markedly increases when investing in ‡exibility. In Table 2 , we focus on the impact that a change in the expected trend, , may have. We note that in the majority of cases, 1) the municipality prefers to invest in the maximum recycling capacity and 2) investment occurs earlier in the presence of ‡exibility. The expected time of adoption is decreasing in : In particular, E( ; p; e p) = 1 for = 0. As explained above, this is due to the fact that there is a positive probability of never hitting the investment threshold, i.e., G(p; 1; e p) < 1.
When considering a ‡exible program, there are, however, marked gains in terms of probability of adoption as uncertainty rises. The value attached to the disposal program is increasing in :
Higher N P V are attached to higher growth in recycling pro…tability. Note also that for high levels of uncertainty the ‡exible program performs better when the drift is null (higher (x; b p )). This makes sense, considering that if the recycling pro…tability is expected to grow, the hedging policy available within a ‡exible program is less valuable. This is due to the lower likelihood of q falling below 1. In contrast, the activation of the hedging policy is more likely when = 0. Finally, the positive relationship between (x; b p ) and holds also for = 0:
The E¤ect of a Change in the Drift on Timing and Program Value for i= 5; r = 0:05; T = 10 and = 2
In Table 3 , in order to isolate the e¤ect of the interest rate, r, we set = 0. We note that by raising r to 10%, we have two opposite e¤ects on the investment thresholds set for both feasible programs. In fact, while the investment in a ‡exible program is postponed, the investment in a non- ‡exible program is anticipated. To explain this di¤erence, again, recall that the investment in a non- ‡exible program occurs at no cost (i = 0). In addition, the current value of future payo¤s decreases since they are discounted at a higher rate. This easily explains the rush in investing in a non- ‡exible program. In contrast, when investing in a ‡exible program, the e¤ect of discounting on future payo¤s is balanced by the e¤ect of a higher user cost for the capital needed to purchase ‡exibility. In Table 3 , the second e¤ect is prevailing in every scenario. This clearly has a huge impact on the performance of the ‡exible program when compared to a non- ‡exible one. Note that (x; b p ) is decreasing in r and the ‡exible program performs poorly for = 0:1. As above, the performance improves, as uncertainty risesand reaches 90% for = 0:3. This con…rms again the relevance of ‡exibility in terms of program value. Similarly, note also that, despite its higher cost, a full recycling capacity is chosen.
TABLE 3
The E¤ect of a Change in the Interest Rate on Timing and Program Value for i = 5; = 0; T = 10 and = 2
Finally, we study the e¤ect of investment cost convexity, . Recall that in the interval 2 (0; 1] the investment cost is decreasing in . In the three scenarios represented in Table 4 , the municipality would always install full recycling capacity within the ‡exible program. Thus, the e¤ect of is highly similar to the e¤ect of a higher i. As decreases, the investment in a ‡exible program is postponed, and its relative pro…tability, (x; b p ), drops. Note that in Table 4 we set r = 0:1 so that, not surprisingly, the investment in a non- ‡exible program occurs earlier in the majority of cases. It is, however, worth pointing out the strength of a ‡exible program which improves its performance in terms of (x; b p ) as uncertainty increases.
TABLE 4
The 
Conclusion
The design of a waste management program is a crucial choice for a municipality. This must be made by taking into account, on the one hand, the constraints …xed on the disposal methods available and, on the other hand, the economic pro…tability of the adopted program. Despite the increasing popularity of recycling programs, their actual economic pro…tability remains weak. This is mainly due to the level of prices paid for recycled materials, which, for some speci…c materials, do not even cover the cost of recycling. In addition, investment in recycling capacity is also discouraged by the volatility characterizing the dynamic of prices in secondary markets for raw materials.
In our paper, we propose to hedge against uncertainty about pro…t from recycling by operating a ‡exible waste management program allowing for the use of land…lling whenever recycling is not pro…table. The land…lling disposal strategy, which is generally less costly than recycling, could then act as a bu¤er in periods when prices for recycled materials are too low. Clearly, the operation of a more complex waste management program, allowing for the option to restore land…lling whenever needed, may impose additional investment costs on the municipality. However, we have shown that the value of operational ‡exibility may cover the additional cost and have a positive impact on the decision to invest in recycling capacity. This is mainly explained by the presence of ‡exibility, which may substantially reduce uncertainty about recycling pro…tability. This positive e¤ect may lead to two interesting results. First, investment in recycling within a ‡exible program may occur earlier than within a non- ‡exible program. Second, it may result in a higher expected net present value.
A Appendix

A.1 The value of the ‡exible program
The general solution to the di¤erential equations (5) and (6) takes the form: 20 and O L 2 must be non-negative. 21 At p t = d, the standard pair of conditions for an optimal waste disposal policy must hold. That is, value-matching
and the smooth-pasting
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that p t < d . The optimal share of recycling is given by
From the …rst-order condition for (A.2.1) we obtain As can be easily shown, the second-order condition is always satis…ed. Taking into account the upper and lower bound for we have:
A.3 Proof of proposition 2
Suppose p t d . The optimal share of recycling is given by
The …rst-order condition for (A.3.1) yields
It is easy to check that the second-order condition holds always. 
In order to de…ne the interval where (p t ) < 1 we need to impose that U (p t ) < i. Finally, we simply need to check under which conditions U (d) < i: That is,
A.4 Optimal investment timing
Let's maximize the objective function in (14) with respect to e p. The …rst-order condition is:
It is immediate to derive (14.1) from (A.4.1).
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the de…nition of a maximum at e p is given by the following second-order condition:
Plugging (A.4.1) into (A.4.2) and rearranging, we obtain condition (14.2):
A. A.6 Proof of proposition 5
Substituting N P V R (p ; (p )) (where 0 < (p ) < 1) into (14.1), we obtain: We complete the analysis by studying the condition p < p. Note that, using the properties of (p t ); this is equivalent to having (p) > 0. After substituting, we obtain 
